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Abstract
Humans and animals are capable of evaluating actions by considering their long-run future
rewards through a process described using model-based reinforcement learning (RL) algo-
rithms. The mechanisms by which neural circuits perform the computations prescribed by
model-based RL remain largely unknown; however, multiple lines of evidence suggest that
neural circuits supporting model-based behavior are structurally homologous to and over-
lapping with those thought to carry out model-free temporal difference (TD) learning. Here,
we lay out a family of approaches by which model-based computation may be built upon a
core of TD learning. The foundation of this framework is the successor representation, a pre-
dictive state representation that, when combined with TD learning of value predictions, can
produce a subset of the behaviors associated with model-based learning, while requiring
less decision-time computation than dynamic programming. Using simulations, we delineate
the precise behavioral capabilities enabled by evaluating actions using this approach, and
compare them to those demonstrated by biological organisms. We then introduce two new
algorithms that build upon the successor representation while progressively mitigating its
limitations. Because this framework can account for the full range of observed putatively
model-based behaviors while still utilizing a core TD framework, we suggest that it repre-
sents a neurally plausible family of mechanisms for model-based evaluation.
Author summary
According to standard models, when confronted with a choice, animals and humans rely
on two separate, distinct processes to come to a decision. One process deliberatively evalu-
ates the consequences of each candidate action and is thought to underlie the ability to flex-
ibly come up with novel plans. The other process gradually increases the propensity to
perform behaviors that were previously successful and is thought to underlie automatically
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executed, habitual reflexes. Although computational principles and animal behavior sup-
port this dichotomy, at the neural level, there is little evidence supporting a clean segrega-
tion. For instance, although dopamine—famously implicated in drug addiction and
Parkinson’s disease—currently only has a well-defined role in the automatic process, evi-
dence suggests that it also plays a role in the deliberative process. In this work, we present a
computational framework for resolving this mismatch. We show that the types of behaviors
associated with either process could result from a common learning mechanism applied to
different strategies for how populations of neurons could represent candidate actions. In
addition to demonstrating that this account can produce the full range of flexible behavior
observed in the empirical literature, we suggest experiments that could detect the various
approaches within this framework.
Introduction
A key question in both neuroscience and psychology is how the brain evaluates candidate
actions in complex, sequential decision tasks. In principle, computing an action’s expected
long-run cumulative future reward (or value) requires averaging rewards over the many future
state trajectories that might follow the action. In practice, the exact computation of such expec-
tations by dynamic programming or tree search methods may be prohibitively expensive, and
it is widely believed that the brain simplifies the computations occurring at decision time, in
part by relying on “cached” (pre-computed) long-run value estimates [1].
Such caching of values is the hallmark of prominent temporal difference (TD) learning the-
ories, according to which prediction errors reported by phasic dopamine responses update
these cached variables [2–4]. This, in turn, provides a neuro-computational account of inflexi-
ble stimulus-response habits, due to the fact that TD learning cannot update cached values in
response to distal changes in reward (e.g., following reward devaluation). The computationally
cheap but inflexible “model-free” nature of TD learning, which relies only on trial-and-error
interactions with the environment, contrasts with the flexible but computationally expensive
“model-based” nature of dynamic programming and tree search methods, which rely on an
explicit internal model of the environment. Due to the complementary properties of model-
free and model-based value computation, it has been suggested that the brain makes use of
both in the form of parallel RL systems that compete for control of behavior [1].
Although flexible choice behavior seems to demonstrate that humans and animals may use
model-based evaluation in some circumstances, very little is known about how this is actually
implemented in the brain, or indeed to what extent the behavioral phenomena that have been
taken to suggest model-based learning might arise from some simpler approximation. In this
article, we explore a family of algorithms that capture a range of such approximations and, we
argue, provide a promising set of candidates for the neural foundations supporting such
learning.
Our proposals are motivated by multiple suggestive, but also somewhat counterintuitive,
lines of evidence, which suggest that the dopamine system and its key targets are implicated
not just in the model-free behaviors that theory endows them with, but also in the more flexi-
ble choice adjustments that seem to reflect model-based learning [5–11]. This is perplexing for
the standard account because typical model-based algorithms such as value iteration do not
make use of a TD prediction error for long-run reward of the sort associated with dopamine.
Instead, they store internal variables (specifically, predictions about immediate “one-step”
rather than long-run consequences of actions), which require different update rules and error
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signals [12, 13]. Additionally, at choice time, such algorithms require computations that are
structurally different than those typically prescribed to the dopaminergic-striatal circuitry
[14].
In this article, we revisit and extend the successor representation (SR) [15,16],(see also [17–
22]), a predictive state representation that can endow TD learning with some aspects of
model-based value computation, such as flexible adjustment following reward devaluation.
That the SR, when combined with TD learning, can produce such flexible behavior makes it a
promising candidate for a neural foundation for model-based learning, which (because it is
built on top of a TD foundation) can also explain dopaminergic involvement in model-based
learning. However, this approach, in its original form, results in behavioral inflexibilities that
could serve as empirical signatures of it, but also make it inadequate for fully explaining organ-
isms’ planning capacities. In particular, the SR simplifies planning by caching a set of interme-
diate quantities, expectations about cumulative future state occupancies. For this reason,
unlike model-based learning, it is incapable of solving many tasks that require adjusting to
changes in contingencies between actions and their long-run consequences (e.g. [23,24]).
In this article, we explore a family of algorithms based around the SR, and introduce two
new variants that mitigate its limitations. In particular, we examine algorithms in which the SR
is updated either by computation at choice time or off-line by replayed experience, both of
which help to ameliorate its problems with caching. These approaches can each account for
human and animal behavior in a wide range of planning tasks, suggest connections with other
models of learning and dopamine, and make empirically testable predictions. Overall, these
approaches represent a family of plausible and computationally efficient hypothetical mecha-
nisms for the full range of flexible behaviors associated with model-based learning, and could
provide a clear theoretical foundation for future experimental work.
The article is organized as follows. In the remainder of this introduction, we review the for-
malism of reinforcement learning in a Markov decision process (MDP) and use this frame-
work to delineate the problem of model-based flexibility arising from model-free circuitry and
elucidate how the SR offers a potential solution to this problem. In the results section, we use
simulations to demonstrate the precise behavioral limitations induced by computing values
using the SR, as originally described, and evaluate these limitations with respect to the behav-
ioral literature. We then introduce two new versions of the SR that progressively mitigate these
limitations, and again simulate their expected consequences in terms of flexible or inflexible
choice behavior.
Formalism: Model-based and model-free reinforcement learning
Here, we briefly review the formalism of reinforcement learning in a Markov decision process
(MDP), which provides the foundation for our simulations (see [25] or [26] for a fuller
presentation).
An MDP is defined by a set of states, a set of actions, a reward function R(s,a) over state/
action pairs, and a state transition distribution, P(s0|s,a), where a denotes the chosen action.
States and rewards occur sequentially according to these one-step functions, driven by a series
of actions; the goal is to learn to choose a probabilistic policy over actions, denoted by π, that
maximizes the value function, Vπ(s), defined as the expected cumulative discounted reward:
VpðsÞ ¼ Ep½
P1
k¼0g
kRtþk jSt ¼ s:
Here, γ is a parameter controlling temporal discounting. The value function can also be
defined recursively as the sum of the immediate reward of the action chosen in that state, R(s,
a), and the value of its successor state s’, averaged over possible actions, a, and transitions that
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would occur if the agent chose according to π:
VpðsÞ ¼
P
apðajsÞ½Rðs; aÞ þ
P
s0Pðs
0js; aÞgVpðs0Þ ð1Þ
The value function under the optimal policy is given by:
VðsÞ ¼ maxaE½
P1
k¼0g
kRtþkjSt ¼ s;At ¼ a
¼ maxa½Rðs; aÞ þ
P
s0Pðs
0js; aÞgVðs0Þ
ð2Þ
Knowledge of the value function can help to guide choices. For instance, we can define the
state-action value function as the value of choosing action a and following π thereafter:
Qpðs; aÞ ¼ Ep½
P1
k¼0g
kRtþkjSt ¼ s;At ¼ a
¼ Rðs; aÞ þ
P
s0Pðs
0js; aÞgVpðs0Þ
ð3Þ
Then at any state one could choose the action that maximizes Qπ(s,a). (Formally this defines
a new policy, which is as good or better than the baseline policy π; analogously, Eq 2 can be
used to define the optimal state-action value function, the maximization of which selects opti-
mal actions.) Note that it is possible to write a recursive definition for Q in the same manner as
Eq 1, and work directly with the state-action values, rather than deriving them indirectly from
V.
For expositional simplicity, in this article, we work instead with V wherever possible
(mainly because this is easier to depict visually, and simplifies the notation), and accordingly
we assume in our simulations that the agent derives Q using Eq 3 for guiding choices. To be
concrete, in a spatial “gridworld” task of the sort we simulate, this amounts to computing a
value function V over locations s, and using it to derive Q (the value of actions a heading in
each of the four cardinal directions) by examining V for each adjacent state. Although this sim-
plifies bookkeeping for this class of tasks, this is not intended as a substantive claim. Indeed, the
last algorithm we propose will work directly with Q values, and the others can easily be re-
expressed in this form.
The problem of reinforcement learning is then reduced to learning to predict the value
function Vπ(s) or V

(s). There are two main families of approaches. Model-based algorithms
learn to estimate the one-step transition and reward functions, P(s0|s,a) and R(s,a), from which
it is possible to compute V

(or Q

) using Eq 2. This typically involves unrolling the recursion
in Eq 2 into a series of nested sums, an algorithm known as value iteration. The alternative,
model-free, approach exemplified by TD learning bypasses estimating the one-step model.
Instead, it directly updates a cached estimate of the value function itself. In particular, follow-
ing a transition s! s0 initiated by action a, a reward prediction error, δ, is calculated and used
to update V(s):
d ¼ Rðs; aÞ þ gVðs0Þ   VðsÞ ð4Þ
VðsÞ  VðsÞ þ aTDd
where αTD is a learning rate parameter.
The TD update rule is derived from the recursion in Eq 1: each step iteratively pushes the
left hand side of the equation, V(s), closer to R(s,a) + γV(s0), which is a one-sample estimate of
the right hand side.
Finally, analogous sample-based updates may also be conducted offline (e.g., between steps
of actual, “online” experience). This is a key insight of Sutton’s Dyna architecture [27] (see also
[28]). The approach, like TD, caches estimates of V(s). Here TD learning is supplemented by
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additional offline updates. Specifically, samples consisting of a transition and reward triggered
by a state-action (s,a,r,s’) are generated either from a learned one-step model’s probability dis-
tributions P(s0|s,a) and R(s,a), or instead simply replayed, model-free, from stored episodes of
previously experienced transitions. For each sample, V(s) is then updated according to Eq (4).
Given sufficient iterations of sampling between steps of real experience, this approach can sub-
stitute for explicit value iteration and produce estimates at each step comparable to model-
based approaches that more directly solve Eqs 1 or 2.
A further distinction, which will become important later, is that between on-policy methods,
based on Eq 1, and off-policy methods, based on Eq 2. On-policy methods estimate a policy-
dependent value function Vπ(s), whereas off-policy methods directly estimate the optimal
value function V

(s). Typically, model-based methods are off-policy (since having learned a
one-step model it is possible to use Eq 2 to directly compute the optimal policy); whereas dif-
ferent TD learning variants can be either on- or off-policy.
Model-free learning in the brain
Due to the similarity between the phasic responses of midbrain dopamine neurons, and the
TD prediction error δ (Eq 4), it has long been suggested that this system implements TD learn-
ing [2,3]. More specifically (e.g. [4]; Fig 1A) it has been suggested that values V or Q are associ-
ated with the firing of medium spiny neurons in striatum [29,30], as a function of an input
state (or state-action) representation carried by their afferent neurons in frontal cortex, and
that learning of the value function is driven by dopamine-mediated adjustment of the cortico-
striatal synapses connecting these neurons. Selection among these striatal value representa-
tions would then drive action choice. Although not entirely uncontroversial, a great deal of evi-
dence about dopamine and its targets supports this hypothesis (see [26,31] for fuller reviews).
Such theories provide a neural implementation of Thorndike’s early law of effect, the rein-
forcement principle according to which rewarded actions (here, those paired with positive pre-
diction error) tend to be repeated [34]. However, the hypothesis that animals or humans rely
exclusively on this principle to make decisions has long been known to be false, as demon-
strated by a line of learning experiments whose basic logic traces to rodent spatial navigation
experiments by Tolman [23] (for modern variants, see [6,28,35–37]).
To facilitate simulation and analysis, we here frame the logic of these experiments in terms
of “grid-world” spatial MDPs. When viewed as MDPs, Tolman’s experiments can be divided
into two categories, which require subjects to adjust to either of two different sorts of local
changes in the underlying MDP. Experience with these changes is staged so as to reveal whether
they are relying on cached values or recomputing them from a representation of the full MDP.
Accordingly, revaluation tasks, such as latent learning, reward devaluation, and sensory
preconditioning, examine whether animals appropriately adjust behavior following changes in
R(s,a), such as a newly introduced reward (Fig 2A). Analogously, contingency change (e.g.,
detour or contingency degradation) tasks examine whether animals appropriately adjust
behavior following changes in P(s0|s,a), such as a blocked passageway (Fig 2B). Model-free RL
is insensitive to these manipulations because it caches cumulative expected rewards and
requires additional learning to update the stored V. Conversely, model-based RL, which uses
the one-step model directly to compute V at decision time, reacts immediately and flexibly to
any experience that affects it. Note that the difference in behavior on these types of tasks pre-
dicted by the algorithms is categorical, and not a question of degree or learning speed. In par-
ticular, because of the representations they learn and update, model-based algorithms can
make the correct choice following these manipulations without any further retraining (i.e. so
long as they learn locally about the new contingency or value, they can immediately make
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appropriate choices in distal parts of the state space), whereas model-free algorithms cannot
(in general, they must first experience trajectories starting from the test state and leading to the
state with the changed value or transition contingency). Animals sometimes fail to correctly
update behavior following revaluations, consistent with inflexible, model-free caching schemes
[38]. However, findings that in other circumstances animals can indeed flexibly adapt their
behavior following such manipulations (without any further retraining–e.g. tested on the very
first trial, or without feedback) has long been interpreted as evidence for their use of internal
models, as in model-based RL or similar methods [1,23,39]. A key goal of this article is to inter-
rogate this assumption, and to consider neural mechanisms that, despite falling short of full
model-based RL, might support such behavioral flexibility.
The puzzle of model-based learning and its neural substrates
A further set of rodent lesion studies have used reward devaluation tasks to suggest that appar-
ently model-based and model-free behaviors (i.e., behavior that is either flexible or insensitive
Fig 1. Cortico-striatal loops and reinforcement learning. a) Canonical circuit for TD learning. A dopaminergic
prediction error, signaled in substantia nigra pars compacta and ventral tegmental area, updates the value of
cortically represented states and actions by modifying cortico-striatal synapses. Depending on their value,
represented in striatal medium spiny neurons (MSN), actions are passed through to basal-ganglia action systems.
b) Results of rodent lesion studies. Lesions to a cortico-striatal loop passing through dorsomedial (DM) striatum
prevent flexibly adjusting behavior following reward devaluation. This area receives input from ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and projects, via globus pallidus, to dorsomedial nucleus of the thalamus. This loop is generally
thought to implement model-based learning [32]. Lesions to cortico-striatal loop passing through dorsolateral (DL)
striatum cause animals to maintain ability to flexibly adjust behavior following devaluation, despite over-training.
This area receives input from sensory and motor areas of cortex and projects, via globus pallidus, to posterior
nucleus of the thalamus. This loop is generally thought to implement model-free learning [32]. In addition to
receiving similar dopaminergic innervation from substantia nigra pars compacta (SnC), such loops are famously
thought to be homologous to one another [33].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005768.g001
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following reward devaluation) depend on dissociable sets of brain areas (e.g. [5,40]; Fig 1B).
This led to the hypothesis (e.g., [1,32,41]) that these two forms of reinforcement learning
depend on competing systems in the brain—the dopaminergic TD system previously
described, plus a second–less clearly understood–circuit supporting model-based behavior.
But how is this latter computation carried out in the brain?
A number of fairly abstract theories have been based around explicit computation of the
state-action value based on some form of Eq 3, e.g. by learning an estimate of the one-step
transition function, P(s’|s,a) and the immediate reward function R(s,a) and using them itera-
tively to compute the future value by tree search, value iteration, or Bayesian inference [1,41–
43]. These theories have not spoken in detail about the neural implementation of these compu-
tations, but an accompanying presumption has been that the model-based system does not
rely on a dopaminergic prediction error signal. This is because the TD prediction error of Eq 4
(for γ> 0, which is the parameter regime needed to explain phasic dopamine’s signature
responses to the anticipation as well as receipt of reward [44]) is specifically useful for directly
learning long-run cumulative values V. In contrast, the idea of model-based learning is to
derive these values iteratively by stringing together short-term predictions from a learned one-
step model [12,45]. Note that the prediction error normally thought to be reported by dopa-
mine neurons is not appropriate here: the prediction error signal for updating the immediate
reward model R(s,a) is like Eq 4 but with γ = 0, which is not consistent with anticipatory phasic
dopamine responses. (However, correlates of prediction errors for γ = 0 have been observed
using human fMRI [46]). Furthermore, the hypothesized process of adding these rewards up
over anticipated trajectories at choice time, such as by value iteration or tree search, has no
counterpart in model-free choice. Instead, learning from anticipatory TD errors stores com-
plete long-run values (e.g., in corticostriatal synapses), requiring no further computation at
choice time.
Fig 2. Grid-world representation of Tolman’s tasks. Dark grey positions represent maze boundaries. Light grey positions represent maze
hallways. a) Latent learning: following a period of randomly exploring the maze (starting from S) the agent is notified that reward has been
placed in position R. We examine whether the agent’s policy immediately updates to reflect the shortest path from S to R. b) Detour: after the
agent learns to use the shortest path to reach a reward state R from state S, a barrier is placed in state B. After the agent is notified that state
B is no longer accessible from its neighboring state, we examine whether its policy immediately updates to reflect the new shortest path to R
from S.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005768.g002
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However, neither the rodent lesion data nor another body of work studying the neural cor-
relates of model-based learning in humans suggests such a clean differentiation between the
dopaminergic-striatal circuit (supposed to support TD) and some other presumably non-
dopaminergic substrate for model-based learning. Instead, lesions suggest each type of learn-
ing is supported by a different subregion of striatum, together with connected regions of cortex
(Fig 1B) and basal ganglia. This suggests that putatively model-based and model-free systems
may map onto adjacent but structurally parallel cortico-basal ganglionic loops [33], thus per-
haps involving analogous (striatal) computations operating over distinct (cortical) input repre-
sentations [47].
Also contrary to a strict division between systems, both dorsomedial and dorsolateral stria-
tal territories have similar interrelationships with dopamine [48], though the involvement of
their differential dopaminergic input in devaluation sensitivity has not been completely
assessed [49]. Research on humans’ learning in a two-step MDP (which has similar logic to
devaluation studies) supports the causal involvement of dopamine in model-based learning
[7–10]. Furthermore, dopaminergic recordings in rodents [11] (though see [37]), and neuro-
imaging of prediction error signals in human striatum [6] suggest that these signals integrate
model-based evaluations.
Altogether, the research reviewed here supports the idea that model-based evaluations are
at least partly supported by the same sort of dopaminergic-striatal circuit thought to support
TD learning, though perhaps operating in separate cortico-striatal loops. This suggestion, if
true, provides strong hints about the neural basis of model-based behavior. However, for the
reasons discussed above, this also seems puzzlingly inconsistent with the abstract, textbook
[50] picture of model-based learning by Eq 3.
Several more neurally explicit theories of some aspects of model-based computation have
been advanced, which go some way toward resolving this tension by incorporating a dopami-
nergic component. Doya [51] introduced a circuit by which projections via the cerebellum per-
form one step of forward state prediction, which activates a dopaminergic prediction error for
the anticipated state. The candidate action can then be accepted or rejected by thresholding
this anticipated prediction error against some aspiration level. It is unclear, however, how this
one-step, serial approach can be generalized to tasks involving stochastic state transitions,
direct comparison between multiple competing actions, or rewards accumulated over multiple
steps (as in tasks like [52]).
A similar idea has arisen from recordings in spatial tasks, where the firing of place cells
along trajectories ahead of the animal suggests a hippocampal basis for a similar (though
multi-step) state anticipation process, potentially driving evaluation of these candidate states
using learned reward values in ventral striatum [53]. It is, however, unclear how this activity
fits into a larger circuit for accumulation of these evaluations and comparison between
options.
Finally, another candidate approach is based on the Dyna framework discussed above. In
this case, model-generated experience can be played back “off-line,” e.g. between trials or dur-
ing rest. These ersatz experiences can, in turn, drive dopaminergic prediction errors and
updating of striatal Q values using the same mechanisms as real experience. As noted above,
given sufficient off-line replay, this can achieve the same effect as model-based planning; in
particular, it can update Q values following revaluation and other manipulations [28,54]. How-
ever, without a more traditional “on-line” planning component, this approach degrades (to
that of basic, model-free Q learning) when there is insufficient time or resources for off-line
replay, and when truly novel situations are encountered [28].
Here we propose and analyze a different family of approaches to these problems, which
relate to the above proposals in that they incorporate elements of upstream predictive input to
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ventral striatum, and also of a different and more-flexible approach to offline updates. The
proposed approach, based on the SR, builds even more directly on the standard TD learning
model of dopaminergic-striatal circuitry.
The successor representation
The research reviewed above suggests that flexible, seemingly model-based choices may be
accomplished using computations that are homologous to those used in model-free RL. How
can this be? In fact, it is known that evaluations with some features of model-based learning
can result from TD learning over a different input representation. As shown by Dayan [15], Eq
1 can reformulated as:
VpðsÞ ¼
P
s0M
pðs; s0Þ
P
apðajs
0ÞRðs0; aÞ ð5Þ
Here, Mπ is a matrix of expected cumulative discounted future state occupancies, measuring
the cumulative time expected to be spent in each future state s0, if one were to start in some
state s and follow policy π (Fig 3):
Mpðs; s0Þ ¼ E½
P1
t¼0g
tIðst ¼ s
0Þ jS0 ¼ s; ð6Þ
where IðÞ ¼ 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise. Thus, this form rearranges the expecta-
tion over future trajectories in Eq 1 by first computing expected occupancies for each state,
then summing rewards obtained, via actions, in each state over these.
Mπ can also be used as a set of basis functions for TD learning of values. Specifically, we rep-
resent each state using a vector of features given by the corresponding row of M (Fig 3), i.e. by
the future occupancies expected for each state s0. Then we approximate Vπ(s) by some
weighted combination of these features:
VpðsÞ ¼
P
s0M
pðs; s0Þwðs0Þ ð7Þ
Comparing Eqs 5 and 7 demonstrates this approximation will be correct when the weight w
(s0) for each successor state corresponds to its one-step reward, averaged over actions in s0, ∑aπ
(a|s0)R(s0,a). One way to learn these weights is using standard TD learning (adapted for linear
function approximation rather than the special case of a punctate state representation). In par-
ticular, following a transition s! s0, each index i of w is updated:
wðiÞ  wðiÞ þ aTDdM
pðs; iÞ ð8Þ
Here, δ is defined as in Eq 4. Note that in the algorithms discussed below, the agent must
estimate the successor matrix Mπ from experience. If the feature matrix Mπ were known and
static, a simpler alternative to Eq (8) for w would be to learn the one-step rewards by a delta
rule on the immediate reward R. Since the successor representation is just a particular case of a
linear feature vector for TD learning, the advantage of learning weights by the TD rule of Eq 8
is that weights learned this way will estimate value Vπ for any feature matrix M, such as esti-
mates of the successor matrix Mπ prior to convergence (S1 Fig).
Altogether, this algorithm suggests a strategy for providing different inputs into a common
dopaminergic/TD learning stage to produce different sorts of value predictions (see also [16]).
In particular, whereas model-free valuation may arise from TD mapping of a punctate repre-
sentation of the current state (Fig 3B) in sensory and motor cortex to values in dorsolateral
striatum (Fig 1B), at least some aspects of model-based valuation may arise by analogous TD
mapping of the successor representation (Fig 3C and 3D) in prefrontal cortex or hippocampus
to values in dorsomedial striatum (Fig 1B). This is possible because the successor matrix M has
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a predictive aspect reflecting knowledge of the state transitions P(s0|s,a), at least in terms of
aggregate occupancy, separate from the state/action rewards R(s,a).
This approach may thus offer a solution to how flexible, seemingly model-based choices
can be implemented, and indeed can arise from the same dopaminergic-striatal circuitry that
carries out model-free TD learning. What remains to be shown is whether algorithms based
on this strategy–applying the SR as input to TD learning–can produce the full range of model-
based behaviors. In the remainder of this paper, we simulate the behavior of such algorithms
to explore this question.
To simulate learning using the SR, we need to also simulate how the successor matrix Mπ is
itself produced from experience. Mπ can be defined through a recursive equation that is
directly analogous to Eqs 1 and 2:
Mpðs; :Þ ¼ 1s þ g
P
s0T
pðs; s0ÞMpðs0; :Þ; ð9Þ
where 1s is the vector of all zeros except for a 1 in the sth position and Tπ is the one-step state
transition matrix that is dependent on π, Tπ(s,s0) = ∑aπ(a|s) P(s0|s,a).
Similar to how approaches to estimating V are derived from Eqs 1 and 2, one could derive
analogous approaches to estimating Mπ from Eq 9. Specifically, one could utilize a “model-
based” approach that would learn Tπ and use it iteratively to derive a solution for Mπ.
Fig 3. Example state representations. a) Agent position (rodent image) in a maze whose hallways are
indicated by grey. b) Punctate representation of the agent’s current state. Model-free behavior results from TD
computation applied to this representation c,d) Possible successor representations of agent’s state. Model-
based behavior may result from TD applied to this type of representation. The successor representation
depends on the action selection policy the agent is expected to follow in future states. The figures show the
representation of the current state under a random policy (c) versus a policy favoring rightward moves (d).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005768.g003
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Alternatively, a TD learning approach could be taken to learn Mπ directly, without use of a
one-step model Tπ. (This approach is analogous to model-free TD methods for learning V,
though it is arguably not really model-free since Mπ is itself a sort of long-run transition
model.) This TD learning approach would cache rows of M and update them after transition-
ing from their corresponding states, by moving the cached row closer to a one-sample estimate
of the right hand side of Eq 9. Lastly, such TD updates could also occur offline, using simulated
or previously experienced samples. This approach for learning Mπ would be comparable to the
Dyna approach for learning V. The three models we consider below correspond to these three
different possibilities.
Finally, note that SR-based algorithms have favorable computational properties; in particu-
lar, at choice time, given Mπ (e.g. if it is learned and cached rather than computed from a one-
step model), SR can compute values Vπ with a single dot product (e.g., a single layer of a linear
neural network, Eq 7), analogous to model-free TD algorithms. This is in contrast to the multi-
ple steps of iterative computation required at choice time for computing value via Eq 1 in stan-
dard model-based approaches. This comes at the cost of storing the successor matrix Mπ: if S is
the number of states in the task, the SR matrix has a number of entries equal to S2. Such entries
of Mπ can be stored as the (all-to-all) set of weights from a single layer of a neural network
mapping input states to their successor representation.
Results
In the following sections, we explore the behavioral consequences of each of these strategies.
We structure the results as follows. For each learning method, we first present the algorithm.
Then we present the results of simulations using that algorithm. The purpose of simulations is
to verify our qualitative reasoning about the behavior of the algorithm and illustrate how the
algorithm’s behavior compares to that of model-based dynamic programming methods. These
simulations also suggest experiments that could be used to identify whether an animal or
human were planning using such a strategy. Each task that we simulate is designed to be a cate-
gorical test of the algorithm. Following some change in the task to which the agent must
respond, some of the algorithms can arrive at the correct decision without additional experi-
ence, but other algorithms cannot. Such failures are due to the computational properties of the
algorithms themselves and are thus parameter-independent. To ensure that this is the case, for
each simulation presented in the results, we have verified that the qualitative result can be
observed robustly under a wide range of parameter settings. In general, there are parameter
settings under which models, which are demonstrated below to succeed in a given task, can be
made to fail it. However, there are no parameter settings under which a model that is shown
below to fail a given task will pass it (S1 Table).
For each algorithm, we discuss its biological plausibility as well as how that algorithm’s per-
formance lines up with that of animals.
Algorithm 1: The original successor representation (SR-TD)
The original SR [15] (which we call SR-TD) constructs the future state occupancy predictions
Mπ using a TD learning approach. This approach caches rows of Mπ and incrementally
updates them after transitioning from their corresponding states. Specifically, following each
state transition s! s0 each element of row s is updated as follows:
Mpðs; :Þ  Mpðs; :Þ þ aSR½1s þ gM
pðs0; :Þ   Mpðs; :Þ; ð10Þ
where 1s is the vector of all zeros except for a 1 in the sth position. Mπ(s,:) is used as input to
another TD learning stage, this time to learn the weights w for predicting expected future
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value from the state occupancy vector. To simulate SR-TD, we have the agent learn Mπ and w
in parallel, updating each (according to Eqs 10 and 8, respectively) at each transition; and sam-
ple actions according to an -greedy policy (see Methods).
Simulation results
SR-TD can solve some reward revaluation tasks. SR-TD is able to produce behavior
analogous to model-based learning in some reward revaluation tasks that categorically defeat
simple TD learning. To demonstrate this, we simulated the behavior of SR-TD in a grid-world
version of Tolman’s latent learning task (Fig 2A). The agent first explores the grid-world ran-
domly, during which it learns the successor matrix Mπ corresponding to a random policy.
Next, it learns that reward is available at position R (importantly, by being placed repeatedly at
R and receiving reward, but not experiencing trajectories leading there from any other loca-
tion). This experience induces prediction errors that cause the agent to update its weight vec-
tor, w in the position corresponding to the rewarded state. Finally, in a test probe, we allow the
agent to form values by multiplying its current version of Mπ with w, and measure whether
(immediately on the first test trial following reward training) those values would produce a
policy reflective of the shortest path from position S to R.
Fig 4B shows SR-TD performance on a latent learning task: SR-TD can, without further
learning, produce a new policy reflecting the shortest path to the rewarded location (Fig 2B).
As a comparison to SR-TD’s performance, we also simulated the behavior of a simpler foil
algorithm that represents model-free (or, actually, limited model-based) performance. This
algorithm applied TD learning updates to non-predictive, punctate, state representations to
estimate V. As with the SR, we permitted this algorithm to convert state values to state-action
values by using a single-step of model-based look-ahead. Although this algorithm’s perfor-
mance is representative of the failure of fully model-free algorithms at solving these revaluation
tasks, we designed it to go beyond a vanilla model-free TD algorithm by allowing a single-step
of model-based lookahead. This is analogous to a limited sort of model-based learning that has
been suggested previously to be implemented by the basal ganglia and cerebellum [51]. Fig 4A
shows that this algorithm cannot solve latent learning problems: it learns nothing about paths
around the maze from the reward training, and would have to discover the path to the new
reward from scratch by additional exploration.
SR-TD cannot solve transition revaluation tasks. However, SR-TD is limited in its abil-
ity to react correctly to other seemingly similar manipulations. Because Mπ reflects long-run
cumulative state occupancies, rather than the individual one-step transition distribution, P(s’|
s,a), SR-TD cannot adjust its valuations to local changes in the transitions without first updat-
ing Mπ at different locations. This inflexibility prevents SR-TD from flexibly adjusting value
estimates after learning about changes in transition structure (“transition revaluation”; Fig
4B). Consider a grid-world version of Tolman’s detour task (Figs 2B and 4D). Here, following
an exploration period during which the agent is able to form an estimate of Mπ under a ran-
dom policy, the agent is trained to seek reward at R, starting from S. Later, a blockade is intro-
duced at B. Again, the agent is allowed to experience this change only locally, by repeatedly
being dropped in the state next to the barrier, attempting the action that leads to it and learn-
ing that the states to the right are no longer accessible from this state. This experience causes
the agent to update Mπ for the state immediately next to the barrier. However, despite this
update, the rows of Mπ corresponding to the states that lie along a path between the start state
and the state next to the barrier remain unchanged. From Eq 10, it can be seen that these
updates can only occur from direct experience, i.e., a series of new trajectories starting at these
states that encounter the barricade. SR-TD fails to reduce the value of these states (Fig 4D),
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and thus would approach the barricade rather than taking a detour on the first visit back to S.
As shown in supplemental materials, the depth-limited model-free algorithm also fails this test
(S1 Table). A fully model-based algorithm (not shown) does make the correct choice in this
case.
Interim discussion
Biological plausibility. The reward learning stage of this rule (learning weights w to map
Mπ(s,:) to Vπ(s)) is the standard dopaminergic TD rule, Eqs 4 and 8, operating over a new
Fig 4. Behavior of SR-TD. a) One-step of model-based lookahead combined with TD learning applied to punctate representations
cannot solve the latent learning task. Median value function (grayscale) and implied policy (arrows) are shown immediately after the
agent learns about reward in latent learning task. b) SR-TD can solve the latent learning task. Median value function (grayscale) and
implied policy (arrows) are shown immediately after the agent learns about reward in latent learning task. c) SR-TD can only update
predicted future state occupancies following direct experience with states and their multi-step successors. For instance, if SR-TD
were to learn that s” no longer follows s’, it would not be able to infer that state s” no longer follows state s. Whether animals make
this sort of inference is tested in the detour task. d) SR-TD cannot solve detour problems. Median value function (grayscale) and
implied policy (arrows) are shown after SR-TD encounters barrier in detour task. SR-TD fails to update decision policy to reflect the
new shortest path.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005768.g004
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input. The update rule for that input, Mπ(s,:), is also based on a TD learning rule, but here
applied to learning to predict cumulative future state occupancies. This uses a vector-valued
error signal to update an entire row of Mπ at each step. Crucially, despite the functional simi-
larity between this rule and the TD update prescribed to dopamine, we do not suggest that
dopamine carries this second error signal. Neurally, this sort of learning might, instead, be
implemented using Hebbian associative learning between adjacent consecutive states [55],
with decaying eligibility traces (like TD(1)) to capture longer-run dependencies. Lastly,
although we have defined the successor representation over tabular representations of states, is
also possible to combine the SR with function approximation and distributed representations
in order to reduce its dimensionality [21,56].
Behavioral adequacy. SR-TD is capable of solving some reward revaluation experiments.
For similar reasons, SR-TD can solve sensory preconditioning (e.g. [37]) and reward devalua-
tion tasks (e.g. [6,28,35,36]), both of which turn on an analogous ability to update behavior
when state transition probabilities are held constant but reward values are changed. Evidence
for model-based behavior in animals and humans has typically come from these types of tasks,
suggesting that SR-TD could underlie a good proportion of behavior considered to be model-
based. However, SR-TD is incapable of solving seemingly analogous tasks that require replan-
ning under a transition rather than a reward change. Because there is at least some evidence
from the early literature [57] that animals can adapt correctly to such detour situations, we
suggest that this inflexibility prevents SR-TD, on its own, from being a plausible mechanism
for the full repertoire of model-based behavior.
Algorithm 2: Dynamic recomputation of the successor representation
(SR-MB)
Here, we explore a novel “model-based” approach, SR-MB, for constructing the expected state
occupancy vector Mπ(s,:). SR-MB learns a one-step transition model, Tπ and uses it, at decision
time, to derive a solution to Eq 9. One key constraint on a model-based implementation sug-
gested by the data is that the computation should be staged in a way consistent with the archi-
tecture suggested by Fig 1A. Specifically, the TD architecture in Fig 1A suggests that, because
the states are represented in cortex (or hippocampus) and weights (which capture information
about rewards) and value are represented in downstream cortico-striatal synapses and medium
spiny striatal neurons, information about R(s,a) and V(s) should not be used in the online con-
struction of states. For the SR approach, this implies that M be constructed without using direct
knowledge of R(s,a) or V(s). As we see below, this serial architecture–a cortical state-prediction
stage providing input for a subcortical reward-prediction stage–if true, would impose interest-
ing limitations on the resulting behavior.
To construct Mπ(s,:), SR-MB first learns the one-step state transition matrix Tπ, imple-
mented in our simulations through separate learning of P(s0|s,a) as well as π(a|s), the agent’s
previously expressed decision policy (see Methods). Prior to each decision, Tπ is used to com-
pute a solution to Eq 9. This solution can be expressed in either of two forms. A given row, s,
of M can be computed individually as the sum of n-step transition probabilities starting from
state s:
Mpðs; :Þ ¼ 1Ts þ gT
pðs; :Þ þ g2Tp2ðs; :Þ þ g3Tp3ðs; :Þ . . . ¼
P1
n¼0g
nTpnðs; :Þ ð11Þ
Alternatively, matrix inversion can be used to solve for the entire successor matrix at once:
Mp ¼ ðI   gTpÞ  1 ð12Þ
The successor representation as a mechanism for model-based behavior
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005768 September 25, 2017 14 / 35
To implement SR-MB, we use Eq 12. However, this is not a mechanistic commitment of the
model, since Eq 11 is equivalent.
Given Mπ, SR-MB learns the reward prediction weights w and forms V and Q values in the
same way as SR-TD.
Note finally that this scheme is similar to solving Eq 1 for on-policy values Vπ by value itera-
tion, except that the sums are rearranged to put state prediction upstream of reward predic-
tion, as per Eq 7 and in line with the neural architecture of Fig 1A. The max operator in Eq 2
prevents a similar rearrangement that would allow this scheme to be used for off-policy opti-
mal values V

(Eq 2), as discussed below. The restriction to on-policy values Vπ is the major
empirical signature of this version of the model.
Simulation results
SR-MB can solve transition revaluation tasks. Using an updated Tπ to recompute Mπ at
decision time ensures that behavior is sensitive to changes in the transition structure. We dem-
onstrate this by showing that unlike SR-TD, SR-MB successfully solves Tolman’s detour task
in addition to latent learning. In the detour task, after being dropped in the state next to the
barrier, SR-MB updates its estimate of P(s’|sa) for the sa leading into the barrier. This new P(s’|
sa) is then combined with the estimate of π(s,a) (learned through prior experience including
initial random exploration of the maze and then trials starting in S and ending in R) to com-
pute Tπ. The row of Tπ corresponding to the state next to the barrier at this point now no lon-
ger predicts transitioning into the barrier state. When the agent then recomputes Mπ by Eq 12,
using the updated Tπ, rows of Mπ corresponding to the path between the start state and the
barrier no longer predict future occupancy of states on the other side of the barrier. When Mπ
is then used to compute Vπ, the values immediately (on the first test trial after the barrier is
encountered) result in a policy reflective of the new shortest path (Fig 5A.)
SR-MB is limited by policy dependence. SR-MB is able to solve both tasks that have been
used as examples of planning in animals and humans. We thus sought to determine whether
there were any tasks, perhaps not yet explored in the empirical literature, that could differenti-
ate it from approaches that utilize “full” model-based value iteration. A key feature of SR-MB,
as well as SR-TD, is that it computes Mπ with respect to a policy π. For SR-MB, Tπ is computed
using π(a|s), which is learned through observation of previous actions. Because Mπ is policy
dependent, so are the value estimates that it produces. SR-TD and SR-MB are thus “on-policy”
methods–their estimates of Vπ can be compared to the estimates of a traditional model-based
approach used to solve Eq 1. A key limitation of “on-policy” methods is that their value esti-
mates are made with respect to the policy under which learning occurred. This is an important
limitation, as we will see below, because new learning about parts of the MDP can moot the
previously learned policy π (and hence invalidate the associated successor matrix and values).
For the successor representation strategy, this limitation could be bypassed if we could
compute M

–an “off-policy” successor matrix based on the successor states expected under the
optimal policy–which would, in turn provide the state input for solving for V

, the optimal
long-run values. However, given the architectural constraints we have suggested, computing
M

is not straightforward. In particular, defining Eq 9 with respect to the optimal policy would
require replacing Tπ with T: the one-step transition matrix corresponding to the optimal pol-
icy, T

(s,s’) = P(s’|s,a

), where a

is the action in state s that maximizes future rewards. Comput-
ing a

online, however, would require access to R(s,a), which would violate the suggested serial
staging of the computation, that M be constructed without using reward information. Policy
dependence of value predictions thus defines both the major limitation as well as the empirical
signature of SR-MB.
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SR-MB cannot solve novel policy revaluation tasks. What are the behavioral implica-
tions of SR-MB estimating values using the policy that was expressed during learning? Con-
sider a situation where state s’ can be reached from state s using action a, but SR-MB learned
from past behavior that π(a|s) is near 0 (Fig 5B). Then it will not include rewards at s’ in the
value of s, even if separately learning (say, by visiting s’ but not in a trajectory starting from s)
Fig 5. Behavior of SR-MB. a) SR-MB can solve the detour task. Median value function (grayscale) and implied policy (arrows) after SR-MB encounters
barrier. b) SR-MB determines successor states relative to a cached policy. If SR-MB learned from previous behavior that it will always select action a1, the
value of s would become insensitive to changes in reward at s2’. C) Novel “policy” revaluation task. After a phase of random exploration, we place a
reward in location R1. The agent completes a series of trials that alternatively start from locations S1 and S2 and end when R1 is reached. We then place
a larger reward in location R2 and record the agent’s value function and implied policy upon encountering it. d) SR-MB cannot solve the novel “policy”
revaluation task. Median value function and implied policy recorded immediately after SR-MB learns about reward placed in location R2. Notice that if the
agent were to start from location S1, its policy would suboptimally lead it to the smaller reward at R1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005768.g005
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that s’ is the most rewarding state reachable from s. In other words, caching of the policy at s
blinds the agent (without further exploration and relearning) to changes in the reward func-
tion that should change that policy. Value iteration based on Eq 2 does not have this limitation
because the max operation would look ahead to the reward at s’ to determine whether it should
be included.
These considerations suggest a novel revaluation task (Fig 5C). Here, SR-MB first performs
many trials where R1 is rewarded, starting from both S1 as well as a new start position, S2.
This experience causes the agent to learn a policy π(s,a) that reflects moves away from the bot-
tom right corner of the maze. Next, a larger reward is introduced at R2. Despite having learned
about this reward (by starting at R2 and updating w at the state corresponding to this location),
because computation of Mπ utilizes Tπ, which reflects moves away from the bottom right cor-
ner of the maze, Mπ does not predict the future occupancy of state R2 from any state along a
path starting at S1. Because of this, the values of these states do not update to include the newly
updated parts of the weight vector corresponding to position R2. Thus, despite the higher
reward in R2, the agent would choose to head toward R1 from S1, due to caching of the incor-
rect policy in Tπ (Fig 5D). Thus, this task defeats SR-MB (as well as, shown in supplemental
materials, the depth limited model-free planners and SR-TD; see also [22]), though it can be
solved by standard model-based learning using Eq 2.
Interim discussion
Biological plausibility. SR-MB requires the brain to compute Mπ(s,:) from Tπ(s,:) for a
particular state s under evaluation. Although in our simulations, we used Eq 12 to compute
the entire successor matrix at once, this is not a mechanistic commitment of the model. For
instance, recurrent neural networks offer a simple way to compute Mπ(s,:) based on spreading
activation implementing Eq 11. Consider a network with one node for each state and the
weight between node s and node s’ set to γTπ(s,s0). If node s is activated, then at each successive
time step, the network activity will represent each successive component of the sum. Indeed,
this model arose in the early connectionist literature [17].
Alternatively, it is also well established that recurrent neural networks can perform matrix
inversion by relaxing to an attractor [58], making a computation based on Eq 12 plausible as
well.
A final mechanism for computing M from T would involve sampling transitions from T off-
line and using them to iteratively update M according to Eq 10, the SR-TD update. In the fol-
lowing section, we explore how an approach based on this idea, when carried out over state-
actions, can be used to solve the “off-policy” planning problem as well.
Behavioral adequacy. SR-MB produces the two behaviors that are considered signatures
of planning in the empirical literature: immediate adjustment of decision policy following
learned changes in either reward structure (latent learning) or transition structure (detour
problem). The novel policy revaluation task demonstrates that SR-MB still produces errors
that could in principle be behaviorally detectable, but have not been exercised by standard
experimental tasks [59].
Algorithm 3: Off-policy experience resampling (SR-Dyna)
Here we introduce a third approach towards solving Eq 9, SR-Dyna, which can be compared
to Sutton’s Dyna approach [27] for solving Eqs 1 and 2. Akin to how Dyna replays experienced
transitions offline to update estimates of V(s), SR-Dyna replays experienced transitions to
update the successor matrix. When this approach is combined with an ‘off-policy’ update rule,
similar to Q learning, to update the successor matrix offline, it is capable of solving the off-
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policy planning problem. Utilizing this type of update, however, requires us to work with a
state-action version of the successor representation, H, which can be used directly to form Q
values [60,61]. The key idea here is to define future occupancy not over states but over state/
action pairs, sa. Analogous to Eq 5, Qπ can then be expressed:
QpðsaÞ ¼
P
s0a0Hðsa; s
0a0ÞRðs0a0Þ; ð13Þ
H is a matrix of expected cumulative discounted future state-action visitations, i.e. given
that you are starting with state s and action a, the cumulative (discounted) expected number of
times you will encounter each other state/action pair:
Hðsa; s0a0Þ ¼ E½
P1
t¼0g
tIðsat ¼ s
0a0Þjsa0 ¼ sa: ð14Þ
H can then be used as a linear basis for learning Q(s,a), using the SARSA TD algorithm to
learn a weight for each column of H. In particular, when state-action s’a’ is performed after
state action sa, a prediction error is calculated and used to update w:
d ¼ RðsaÞ þ gQðs0a0Þ   QðsaÞ ð15Þ
wðiÞ  wðiÞ þ aTDdHðsa; iÞ; for all i
Like M, H can be defined recursively:
Hðs; :Þ ¼ 1sa þ g
P
s0T
pðsa; s0a0ÞHðs0a0; :Þ ð16Þ
where Tπ is the one-step state-action transition matrix, Tpðsa; s0a0Þ ¼
P
s0
P
a0Pðs
0js; aÞpða0js0Þ.
As with SR-TD, this recursion can be used to derive a TD-like update rule by which an esti-
mate of H can be iteratively updated:
Hðsa; Þ  Hðsa; Þ þ aSR½1sa þ gHðs
0a0; Þ   Hðsa; Þ ð17Þ
As with SR-MB, it is also possible to derive H from Tπ(sa,s0a0) using an explicit “model-
based” solution analogous to Eq 9. However, here, we investigate the approach of updating H
off-line (e.g., between trials or during rest periods) using replay of experienced trajectories
(e.g. [62]). The key assumption we make is that this off-line replay can sequentially activate
both the state and reward (cortical and basal ganglia) stages of Fig 1A, giving rise to an off-pol-
icy update of H with respect to the policy π

that is optimal given the current rewards. By com-
parison, as articulated above, we assumed such policy maximization was not possible when
computing the successor representation M on-line for SR-MB, since this entire computation
was supposed to happen in cortex at decision time, upstream of the striatal reward learning
stage.
Following each transition, SR-Dyna stores the sample (s,a,s’). Then in between decisions,
SR-Dyna randomly selects (with a recency weighted bias) k samples (with replacement). For
each sample, it updates H as follows:
Hðsa; Þ  Hðsa; Þ þ aSR½1sa þ gHðs
0a0; Þ   Hðsa; Þ ð18Þ
where
a0 ¼ argmaxa0
X
s00a00
Hðs0a0; s00a00Þwðs00a00Þ
That is, when H updates from previously experienced samples, it performs an off-policy
update using the best action it could have chosen, rather than the one it actually chose.
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Simulation results
SR-Dyna can solve policy revaluation tasks. Given sufficient sampling (large enough k),
this off-policy updating not only permits SR-Dyna to solve the detour task, but also to solve
the novel policy revaluation task (Fig 6A). In the policy revaluation task, after the agent is
introduced to the new reward in R2, and updates w, we permit it to draw 10,000 random
Fig 6. Comparison of SR-Dyna and Dyna-Q. Median value function (grayscale) and implied policy after each algorithm (row)
learns about relevant change in each of the 3 tasks (column). Both SR-Dyna (a) and Dyna-Q (b) can solve all 3 tasks when a
sufficient number of samples backed up. c) Without a sufficient number of samples, SR-Dyna can still solve the latent learning task.
d) Without a sufficient number of samples, Dyna-Q cannot solve any of the 3 tasks.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005768.g006
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samples from memory and perform an update for each. With each sample drawn, SR-Dyna
partially adjusts the predictions of future state occupancies from a given state action sa, so that
they become closer to the predictions of future state occupancies from s’a

, where a

is chosen
with consideration of the newly updated w. Such updates thus allow SR-Dyna to re-learn a
new version of Hπ, corresponding to the policy that would result from repeated choices under
the updated w. Once updated, Hπ comes to reflect prediction of future states reflective of a pol-
icy that moves towards the new highest reward in the bottom right of the maze. When the
updated Hπ is then used to compute new values (on the first test trial following the policy
retraining), those values result in a policy that would bring the agent from S to the new highest
reward in R2 along the shortest path. This simulation demonstrates that SR-Dyna can thus
produce behavior identical to “full” model-based value iteration in this task (as well as the
other revaluation tasks previously simulated, as shown in Fig 6). However, it has the potential
advantage that updating can take place fully off-line and thus offload computation to situations
that may be ecologically convenient such as sleep or wakeful rest.
Time constraints can distinguish SR-Dyna from Dyna-Q. SR-Dyna is capable of behav-
ing equivalently to dynamic programming and tree-search in that it can solve transition and
policy revaluation tasks. We were thus interested in how it could be differentiated experimen-
tally. Sutton’s original Dyna algorithm (Dyna-Q) differs from value iteration and tree search in
that its ability to pass revaluation experiments is dependent on having enough time offline to
perform sufficient number of sample backups. Given enough time between decisions, suffi-
cient replay can occur and Dyna-Q can pass any type of revaluation task (Fig 6B). In contrast,
without sufficient offline replay, Dyna-Q degrades to a model-free agent and it cannot pass
any revaluation task (Fig 6D). SR-Dyna is similarly differentiated from tree-search and value
iteration in that its flexibility depends on completing a sufficient number of sample backups
offline. As demonstrated above, given a sufficient number of backups, SR-Dyna can pass any
type of revaluation (Fig 6A). Without sufficient replay, its performance degrades to that of
SR-TD–it can pass reward revaluation but fails transition and policy revaluation (Fig 6C).
SR-Dyna is thus differentiated from Dyna-Q in that, unlike Dyna-Q, without sufficient replay,
it can still pass reward revaluation; that is, it retains a certain degree of “model-based” flexibil-
ity even in the degraded case. These predictions could be tested with experimental designs
aimed at preventing replay by manipulating the length of rest periods or the difficulty of dis-
tractor tasks [27].
Time constraints or distractor tasks at decision time can also disambiguate the different
algorithms. Tree-search and value iteration take time and effort at decision time, whereas
SR-Dyna can support rapid action selection by inspecting its lookup table.
Interim discussion
Biological plausibility. Following real experience, SR-Dyna uses a similar update rule as
SR-TD, yet uses it to operate over state-actions rather than states. This is plausible given that
the same Hebbian learning principles could operate over cortical or hippocampal representa-
tions of state/action conjunctions just as well as they could over states.
As with Dyna-Q, SR-Dyna dovetails nicely with neural evidence about memory replay.
Specifically, the widely demonstrated phenomenon of reactivation during rest or sleep of
sequences of hippocampal activity seen during prior experiences [63,64], seems well suited to
support the sort of off-line updates imagined by both Dyna approaches. (Although we have
not simulated realistic hippocampal replay dynamics here, the Dyna approaches can learn
from experiences replayed in arbitrary order.) The successor matrix updated by SR-Dyna
might itself exist in the recurrent connections of hippocampal neurons [18], though another
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intriguing possibility is that it is instead stored in prefrontal cortex (as in Fig 1B). This second
possibility lines up neatly with complementary system theories in the memory literature,
according to which such hippocampal replay plays a role in post-encoding consolidation of
memories by restructuring how information is represented across neocortical networks
[65,66]. Such a connection should be explored in future research.
Behavioral adequacy. Given sufficient replay, SR-Dyna is capable of producing behavior
as flexible as that of full model-based value iteration. As with Dyna-Q, practical applications of
SR-Dyna in larger environments will require developing sophisticated methods for selecting
which samples to replay (e.g. [67]). We intend to develop such methods in future work.
Discussion
Despite evidence that animals engage in flexible behaviors suggestive of model-based planning,
we have little knowledge of how these computations are actually performed in the brain. Indeed,
what evidence we have–particularly concerning the involvement of dopamine in these compu-
tations–seems difficult to reconcile with the standard abstract computational picture of plan-
ning by tree search using a learned model. We have here proposed variants of the SR that can
address this question, serving as empirically consistent mechanisms for some or indeed all of
the behaviors associated with model-based learning. Moreover, these are each built as utilizing a
common TD learning stage for reward expectancies, allowing them to fit within the systems-
level picture suggested by rodent lesion studies, and also explaining the involvement of dopa-
mine in model-based valuation. In particular, they each envision how model-based learning
could arise from the same dopaminergic TD learning associated with simple model-free learn-
ing, operating over a different and more elaborated cortical input representation.
Accounting for TD circuitry in apparently model-based behavior
More specifically, our motivation to develop this approach was based on three related sets of
findings in the empirical literature. The first are that lesions to dorsomedial striatum prevent
animals from adjusting preferences following reward revaluation [5]. In contrast, lesions to
neighboring dorsolateral striatum cause rats to maintain devaluation sensitivity, even follow-
ing overtraining [40]. In the framework presented here, neurons in dorsomedial striatum
could represent values derived by applying TD learning to the successor representation and
neurons in dorsolateral striatum could represent values derived by applying TD to tabular rep-
resentations. Lesions to dorsomedial striatum would thus force the animal to work with values
in dorsolateral striatum, derived from tabular representations and thus not sensitive to devalu-
ation. In contrast, lesions to dorsolateral striatum would cause the brain to work with values
derived from the SR, which are devaluation-sensitive.
The second set of findings include several reports that the phasic DA response (or analo-
gous prediction error related BOLD signals in humans) tracks apparently model-based infor-
mation [6,11]. We have focused our simulations on choice behavior, and have not presented
our theories’ analogous predictions about the responses of neurons, such as DA cells, thought
to signal decision variables. However, whenever the SR algorithms’ expectations about action
values incorporate "model-based" information (such as latent learning, Fig 4A) neural signals
related to those predictions and to prediction errors would be similarly informed. Thus the
theories predict systematic expectancy-related effects in the modeled dopamine response,
tracking the differences in choice preference relative to the standard “model-free” accounts,
which are blind to reward contingencies in these tasks.
A third distinct set of findings also speaks to a relationship between dopamine and model-
based learning. These are reports that several measures of dopaminergic efficiency (both causal
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and correlational) track the degree to which human subjects engage in model-based decision
strategies in both multistep reward revaluation tasks and multiplayer games [7–10,68]. One
possibility is that these effects reflect strengthened vs. weakened phasic dopaminergic signal-
ing, which in our model controls reward learning for SR-based “model-based” estimates in
dorsomedial striatum. However, this account does not explain the specificity of these effects to
measures of putative model-based (vs. model-free) learning. These effects may instead be
related to functions of dopamine other than prediction error signaling, such as tonic dopa-
mine’s involvement supporting working memory [69] or its hypothesized role controlling the
allocation of cognitive effort [41,70,71].
Other potential explanations
The framework outlined in this paper is not the only direction toward a neurobiologically
explicit theory of putatively model-based behavior, nor even the only suggestion explaining
the involvement of dopamine. As discussed above and pointed out in [28], Sutton’s original
Dyna algorithm–in which experience replayed offline is used to update action values V or Q
directly–offers another avenue by which seemingly model-based flexibility can be built on the
foundation of the standard prediction error model of dopamine. This is a promising piece of
the puzzle, but exclusive reliance on replay to underpin all behavioral flexibility seems unrealis-
tic. Among our innovations here is to suggest that replay can also be used to learn and update
a successor representation, which then confers many of the other advantages of model-based
learning (such as flexibility in the face of reward devaluation) without the dependence on fur-
ther replay to replan. Furthermore, the addition of SR to the Dyna framework explains a num-
ber of phenomena that replay, on its own, does not. For instance, given that Dyna-Q works
with a single set of cached Q values, updated through both experience and replay, it is not clear
how it could, on its own, explain the apparent segregation of revaluation sensitive and insensi-
tive value estimates in dorsomedial and dorsolateral striatum [5,40].
Another potential solution to some of the puzzles motivating this work is that dopamine
could have a role in action selection, as part of a circuit for partial model-based action evalua-
tion [47]. According to this idea, dopamine neurons could compute a prediction error measur-
ing the difference between the value of the current state and the future value of a predicted
successor state, caused by a given candidate action. The size of this prediction error could then
determine whether the action is performed. This mechanism would endow the brain with a
single step of model-based prediction. However, it is not straightforward how this sort of
approach could underlie model-based learning in tasks requiring more than a single step of
prediction, and accordingly our simulations (see Fig 4A and supplemental materials) show
that it cannot solve any of the revaluation tasks considered here, which all probe for deeper
search through the state space. A recent study provided convincing behavioral evidence that
humans sometimes simplify model-based action selection by combining just one step of state
prediction with cached successor state values [72]. Yet this same study along with others [52]
also provided evidence that humans can plan through more than one step and thus are not
confined to this approximation. It is also not straightforward how this sort of mechanism
could endow model-based predictions in cases where stochasticity requires consideration of
“trees” of possible future states.
Nevertheless, by elucidating a more general framework in which a predictive state represen-
tation may feed into downstream dopaminergic reward learning, we view our framework as
fleshing out the spirit of this suggestion while also addressing these issues. We similarly realize
other conceptual suggestions in the literature suggesting that more flexible model-based like
behavior may arise not through tree-search like planning, but rather by applying model-free
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RL to more sophisticated state representations [73]. A more specific application of this idea,
[74] demonstrated that a sophisticated representation that includes reward history can pro-
duce model-based like behavior in the two-step reward revaluation task. The successor repre-
sentation adds to this work by clarifying for any task’s transition structure, the precise
representation that can be used to generate model-based behavior.
Relatedly, because it places model-based state prediction in the input to a standard TD
learning circuit, our framework could easily be extended to include several modules with
inputs corresponding to several different types or granularities of models: for instance, varying
degrees of temporal abstraction corresponding to different time discount factors in Eq 6
[46,75]. This would parallel a number of other recent suggestions that different striatal loops
model the world at different levels of hierarchical abstraction [47,76], while also harmonizing
the somewhat underspecified model-based evaluation process these theories assume with the
predominant temporal difference account of striatal learning.
Multiplicity and arbitration
Although our presentation culminated with proposing an algorithm (SR-Dyna) that can in
principle perform equivalently to full model-based learning using value iteration, this need not
be the only goal and there need not be only a single answer. The behaviors associated with
model-based learning may not have unitary sources in the brain but may instead be multiply
determined. All of the algorithms we have considered are viable candidate pieces of a larger set
of decision systems. Notably, the experiments we have highlighted as suggesting striatal or
dopaminergic involvement in “model-based” learning and inspiring the present work all use
extremely shallow planning problems (e.g. operant lever pressing, two-stimulus Pavlovian
sequences, or two-step MDPs) together with reward revaluation designs. Even SR-TD is suffi-
cient to explain these. It may well be that planning in other tasks, like chess, or in spatial
mazes, is supported by entirely different circuits that really do implement something like tree
search; or that they differentially require replay, like SR-Dyna. Also, although replay-based
approaches go a long way, value computation at choice time using more traditional model-
based approaches is likely needed at the very least to explain the ability to evaluate truly novel
options (like the value of “tea jelly”; [77]) using semantic knowledge. Some evidence that
rodents may use more than just replay to compute values, even in spatial tasks, comes from
findings that the prevalence of sharp-wave-ripples, a putative sign of replay, is inversely related
to the prevalence of vicarious trial and error behaviors, a process thought to be involved in
decision-time value computation, potentially by standard MB dynamic programming or alter-
natively SR-MB [78].
Relatedly, if the brain might cache both endpoint decision variables like Q, or their precur-
sors like M, update either or both with off-line replay, and optionally engage in further model-
based recomputation at choice time, then the arbitration or control question of how the brain
prioritizes all this computation to harvest rewards most effectively and efficiently becomes sub-
stantially more complicated than previously considered. The prioritization of replay–which
memories to replay when–becomes particularly important. The particular ordering and
dynamics of replay are also outside our modeling here: in order to focus our investigation on
the simplest behavioral predictions of SR-Dyna, we chose the simplest, naive sampling scheme
in which the agent replays a single state-action-state transition with uniformly random proba-
bility. This sampling strategy is not a mechanistic commitment (nor of course does it reflect
the dynamics of realistic hippocampal replay trajectories), and we expect that like Dyna-Q,
SR-Dyna would work even more efficiently given more sophisticated replay prioritization
schemes. In this regard, we expect that the prioritization of replay, like the arbitration between
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model-based vs model-free tradeoffs [1,41,79], might operate according to the principles of
efficient cost-benefit management. We expect that in addition to more typical observed pat-
terns of replay, such a scheme may be able to explain cases where the replayed sequences are
not a simple reflection of the animal’s current policy [80]. The current model is robust to dif-
ferences in replay but would need to be extended with a more principled and detailed replay
model to address these questions.
Future experimental work
With simulations, we have presented experiments that could be used to elicit recognizable
behavior form the different algorithms proposed here. Although we ruled out the simplest
approach, SR-TD, due to its inflexibility, it is worth more carefully considering the evidence
against it. The main counterexamples to SR-TD are transition revaluation and detour tasks.
Apart from the classic work of Tolman and Honzik [57], the original results of which are actu-
ally quite mixed (see [81]), there is surprisingly little evidence to go on. A number of different
studies have shown that healthy animals will normally choose the shortest alternative route
after learning about a blockade preventing a previously preferred route (e.g. [82–84]). How-
ever, in these studies, the animal learns about the blockade after starting from the maze starting
location. Thus, unlike in our simulations in which the animal learns about the blockade in iso-
lation, animals in these tasks would have the opportunity to learn from direct experience that
maze locations leading up to the blockade are no longer followed by maze locations further
along the previously preferred path. Such tasks could thus potentially be solved by SR-TD.
Studies that show that animals will take a shortcut to a goal that is discovered along a preferred
path present a somewhat cleaner test for SR-TD [85,86]; however it is often difficult to inter-
pret a potential role of exploration or visual (rather than cognitive map) guidance in the result-
ing behavior. Work in humans, however, seems to more clearly suggest an ability to solve
detour tasks without re-learning [87]. Simon and Daw [24] for instance directly assessed
SR-TD’s fit to human subjects’ choice adjustments in a changing spatial maze, and found it fit
poorly relative to traditional model-based learning.
Overall, additional careful work that measures how animals respond to transition changes,
learned in isolation, is needed. Whereas Tolman’s other early reward revaluation experiments
(latent learning) have been conceptually replicated in many modern, non-spatial tasks like
instrumental reward devaluation and sensory preconditioning, the same is not true of detours.
Indeed, the modern operant task that is often presented as analogous to detours, so-called
instrumental contingency degradation (e.g., [88]), is not functionally equivalent. In such tasks,
the association between an action and its outcome is degraded through introduction of back-
ground rewards. However, because the information about the changed contingency is not pre-
sented separately from the rest of the experience about actions and their rewards, unlike all the
other tests discussed here, contingency degradation as it has been studied in instrumental con-
ditioning can actually be solved by a simple model-free learner that re-learns the new action
values. The puzzle here is actually not how animals can solve the task, but why they should
ever fail to solve it. This has thus led to a critique not of model-based but of model-free learn-
ing theories [47].
In any case, the modeling considerations proposed here suggest that more careful labora-
tory work on “transition revaluation” type changes to detect use of SR-TD, is warranted. Simi-
larly, “policy revaluations” along the lines of that in Fig 5 would be useful to detect to what
extent planning along the lines of SR-MB is contributing. Finally, although SR-Dyna in princi-
ple can perform model-based value computation, this depends on sufficient replay. The
SR-Dyna hypothesis suggests the testable prediction that behavior should degrade to SR-TD
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under conditions when replay can contribute less. A number of experiments in the rodent lit-
erature have explored the behavioral deficits that result from interrupting sharp-wave ripples
(events in which hippocampal replay is known to occur). Such manipulations have been
shown to produce behavioral deficits that are consistent with the SR-Dyna hypothesis, yet not
exclusively predicted by it. For instance, two studies found that suppression of hippocampal
sharp-wave ripples during rest slows down acquisition of the correct behavioral policy in spa-
tial learning tasks in which the task environment is static [89,90]. These results are consistent
with the notion that the purpose of replay is to provide additional experience, which is used to
update some representation relevant to learning. However, these results are not specifically
diagnostic of the successor matrix. For instance, preventing replay would slow down policy
acquisition for Dyna-Q as well as SR-Dyna (S2 Fig).
Another study found a more specific effect of suppressing hippocampal sharp wave ripples
during performance of a task. Here, the manipulation caused learning deficits selective for a
subset of trials in which animals faced a hidden-state problem. In particular, these were trials
in which animals had to choose which direction to turn depending on the events of the previ-
ous trial [91]. Such tasks constitute hidden-state problems, in that the “state” required to make
the correct choice cannot be deduced entirely from an animal’s immediate sensory experience.
In RL terms, to solve these problems, the animals must construct an augmented internal state,
distinct from a simple representation of the immediate sensory situation [92]. One interpreta-
tion of the experimental result is that blocking replay interfered with this internal state con-
struction process.
This result resonates with our SR-Dyna proposal, which also posits that replay is involved
in constructing the mapping between the sensory state and a different, augmented internal
representation of it: the SR. However, our model as currently specified augments the state
space with predictive features to support model-based flexibility, and does not currently
address other sorts of elaborations of the state input that have been used in other work to facili-
tate learning in situations with hidden state or other uncertain sensory input [93–95]. Fully
understanding these results therefore requires augmenting our model to address hidden state
as well as state prediction. In fact, these two functions may be closely related: a number of
approaches to the hidden state problem in the computational RL literature address it using
predictive representations that are related to the SR [96,97].
In human studies, factors like the duration of off-task rest periods and presence of distrac-
tor tasks during such periods have been manipulated to extend, limit, or interfere with replay.
Some evidence suggests that distractor tasks at decision time have no effect on reward revalua-
tion [27], consistent with SR-Dyna. Other recent work has demonstrated that humans benefit
from additional pre-decision time in revaluation tasks that closely resemble “policy revalua-
tion” [98] and that this benefit recruits a network including the prefrontal cortex and basal
ganglia. Such work is consistent with the predictions of both Dyna-Q as well as SR-Dyna
accounts of value updating presented here.
Overall, future work will need to combine such manipulations of replay, with the three
revaluation tasks imagined in this paper and demonstrate differences in the effects of manipu-
lations on reward versus transition and policy revaluations. We have recently demonstrated,
though without attempting to manipulate replay, that humans are worse at adjusting behavior
following transition and policy revaluations compared to reward revaluations, suggesting that
they may at least partially use either an SR-TD or SR-Dyna (with limited sample backups)
strategy for evaluation [59].
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Neural substrate of the successor representation
We have suggested, on the basis of rodent lesion studies, that the SR may be encoded in parts
of prefrontal cortex that project to dorosomedial striatum. However, we should note that
recent work has also implicated the hippocampus as a potential site of the SR. Specifically, a
state-state version of the SR can explain some properties of hippocampal place cells [18,99] as
well as fMRI measures of the representation of visual stimuli in tasks where such stimuli are
presented sequentially [100,101]. This work has largely built on ideas of the hippocampus in
general as a site of cognitive map [102] as well as prior suggestions that hippocampal place
cells may in fact encode the transition structure of the environment [103] and that such transi-
tion information may make them ideal basis functions for TD learning [104] If a state version
of the SR exists in the hippocampus, we think it is reasonable that value weights would be
leaned by neurons connecting the hippocampus to ventral striatum, in the same TD manner
discussed in this paper.
However, we also think a case can be made for the prefrontal cortex as another candidate
basis for an SR. In addition to the rodent lesion evidence reviewed in the introduction of this
paper, the prefrontal cortex shares many cognitive-map properties observed in the hippocam-
pus [105] and has been suggested to be the basis of state representations for reinforcement
learning [93,106]. A number of human studies have demonstrated the PFC’s role in the repre-
sentation of prospective goals [107,108]. Furthermore, unlike the hippocampus, parts of the
PFC appear to be involved in action representation in addition to state representation [109],
thus making it a candidate to hold a potential state-action version of the successor matrix.
Importantly, these proposals are in no way mutually exclusive. For instance, recent work has
demonstrated that hippocampal output is necessary for preserving PFC representations of task
structure [110]. Overall, further experimental work will be required to determine whether
either or indeed both these areas serves as the basis for the successor representation, and what
specific roles they play in learning and representation.
Connection to other cognitive processes
Finally, the SR may contribute to a number of other cognitive processes. Above we noted that
there is evidence that areas of medial temporal lobe seem to encode predictive representations.
In line with this, it has been noted that there is a close correspondence between the update rule
used by SR-TD and update rules in the temporal context model of memory [19]. Also, recent
approaches to reinforcement learning in the brain have advocated for a hierarchical approach
in which punctate actions are supplemented by temporally abstract policies [111]. In this con-
text, it has been suggested that the SR may be useful for discovering useful temporal abstrac-
tions by identifying bottlenecks in the state space that can then be used to organize states and
action into a hierarchy [18,112]. The efficacy of the SR for model-based RL opens the possibil-
ity that the brain accomplishes planning, action chunking, and grouping episodic memories
using a common mechanism.
Overall, this article has laid out a family of candidate mechanistic hypotheses for explaining
the full range of behaviors typically associated with model-based learning, while connecting
them with the circuitry for model-free learning as currently understood. In addition to the
transition and policy revaluation behavioral experiments suggested above, future neuroimag-
ing work could seek evidence for these hypotheses. Specifically, failures to flexibly update deci-
sion policies that are caused by caching of either the successor representation (as in SR-TD or
SR-Dyna with insufficient replay) or a decision policy (as in SR-MB) should be accompanied
by neural markers of non-updated future state occupancy predictions. Such neural markers
could be identified using representational similarity analysis (e.g. [113]), cross-stimulus
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suppression (e.g. [114]) or through use of category specific, decodable, visual stimuli (e.g.
[115]). Similar work in experimental animals such as rodents (e.g. [116]) could use the full
range of invasive tools to trace the inputs to dorsomedial vs. dorsolateral striatum, so as to
examine the information represented there and how it changes following the various sorts of
revaluation manipulations discussed here. As has been the case for model-free learning, the
emergence of an increasingly clear and quantitative taxonomy of different candidate algo-
rithms is likely to guide this work and help to elucidate the neural basis of model-based
learning.
Methods
General simulation methods
All simulations were carried out in 10x10 (N = 100 states) grid-worlds in which the agent
could move in any of the four cardinal directions, unless a wall blocked such a movement.
States with rewards contained a single action. Upon selecting that action, the agent received
the reward and was taken to a terminal state. Each task was simulated with each algorithm 500
times. For each simulation, we recorded the agent’s value function at certain points. For
SR-Dyna, which worked with action values rather than state values, the state value function
was computed as the max action value available in that state. Figures display the median value,
for each state, over the 500 runs. To determine the implied policy for the median value func-
tion, we computed, for each state, which accessible successor state had the maximum median
value.
Specific task procedures
Latent learning task. The latent learning task was simulated in the grid-world environ-
ment shown in Fig 2A. Starting from position S, the agent first took 25000 steps exploring the
maze. After exploration, the reward in position R1 was raised to 10. To learn about the reward,
the agent completed a single step, starting from position R1, 20 times. We then recorded the
state value function.
Detour task. The detour task was simulated using the grid-world environment shown in
Fig 2B. Starting from position S, the agent first took 10000 steps exploring the maze. The
reward in position R was then increased to 10. The agent then completed 5 trials, starting from
position S that ended when the reward was reached. A wall was then added to in position B.
To learn about the wall, the agent completed a single step, starting from the position immedi-
ately left of the wall, 40 times. We then recorded the state value function.
Novel revaluation task. The novel revaluation task was simulated using the environment
in Fig 5C. The agent first completed the entire latent learning task. After successfully reaching
position R1 from position S, the agent then completed 20 trials. Each trial alternately started at
S1 or S2 and ended when the agent reached position R1. We then set the reward in position R2
to 20. To learn about the new reward, the agent completed one step, starting from position R2,
20 times. We then recorded the state value function.
Additional details on algorithms
One-step look-ahead. The one-step look-ahead model stored an estimate of state-value
function Vπ(s). At the beginning of each simulation Vπ was initilzled to 0. Following each tran-
sition Vπ was updated according to Eq 4. Prior to each choice, Q-values for each action a in
state s were then computed as Qπ(s,a) = Vπ(s’) where s’ is the state that deterministically follows
action a in state s. Note that leaving R(s,a) out of this equation works because rewards are
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paired exclusively with actions in terminal states (and thus R(s,a) for non-terminal actions
is 0).
Original successor representation (SR-TD). SR-TD computed Vπ(s) using two struc-
tures: the successor matrix, Mπ(s,s’) and a weight vector, w(s). At the beginning of each simula-
tion, Mπ was initialized as an identity matrix; however, rows corresponding to terminal states
were set to 0. The weight vector was initialized as w = 0. Following each transition, M and w
were updated using Eqs (8) and (10). In implementing the update in Eq 8, each element of the
feature vector, M(s,:), was scaled by M(s,:)  M(s,:)T. This scaling permits the weight learning
rate parameter to maintain a consistent interpretation as proportional step-size. Prior to each
choice, V was computed using Eq (7). Q-values for each action were computed the same as for
the one-step look-ahead model.
Recomputation of the successor matrix (SR-MB). This algorithm starts each task with a
basic knowledge of the ‘physics’ of grid-world: which successor state, s’, would follow each
action sa in a situation in which sa is available (e.g. not blocked by a wall). It also stores and
updates, for each state s, As, the set of actions currently available in state s as well as a policy π
(a|s), which stores the probability of selecting action a in state s (as learned from the agent’s
own previous choices). As was initialized to reflect all four cardinal actions being available in
each state. Each row π were initialized as a uniform distribution over state-actions, π(a|s) =
0.25.
After performing action a in state s and transitioning to state s’, As’ was updated to reflect
which actions are available in state s’ and π is updated using a delta rule:
pð: jsÞ  ap1a þ ð1   apÞpð: jsÞ
where απ is a free parameter.
Prior to each choice, the model computed each row, s, of one-step transition matrix Tπ as
follows:
Tp s; :ð Þ ¼
P
a2AS
pðajsÞ1s0
P
a2AS
pðajsÞ
where 1s0 is a vector zeros of length S with a 1 in position corresponding to state s’ and s’ is the
state to which action a in state s deterministically leads. Tπ was then used to compute M using
Eq 12. Computation of V and Q was then the same as in SR-TD.
Episodic replay algorithm (SR-Dyna). This algorithm computed Q(sa) using two struc-
tures: a state-action successor matrix, H(sa,s’a’) and weight vector w(sa). At the beginning of
each simulation, the successor matrix H was initialized to an identity matrix; however rows
corresponding to terminal states were set to 0. The weight vector was initialized to w = 0. The
algorithm also stored every sample (s,a,s’). After performing action a in state s and transition-
ing to state s’ the sample (s’,a’,s’) was stored, and H and w were updated according to Eqs (15)
and (17). Following each step, we also selected 10 one-step samples (according to recency
weighted probabilities with replacement) from the stored history, and replayed each to update
H according to Eq 18. Following transitions in which a learned change occurred to either the
reward function or available actions, k one-step samples were selected and used to update the
model, where k was set to 10 in the insufficient replay condition and to 10000 in the sufficient
replay condition. Samples were drawn by first selecting a state-action, sa, from a uniform dis-
tribution. A sample then drawn from the set of experienced samples, initiated in sa, according
to an in, initiated from sa was then selected according to an exponential distribution with λ =
1/5.
The successor representation as a mechanism for model-based behavior
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005768 September 25, 2017 28 / 35
Dyna-Q: This algorithm stored Q(sa). At the beginning of each simulation, Q was initial-
ized to 0. The algorithm also stored every experienced sample (s,a,r,s’). After performing action
a in state s, experiencing reward r, and transitioning to state s’ the sample (s’,a’,r,s’) was stored
and Q was updated according to the Q-learning prediction error:
d ¼ RðsaÞ þ g maxa0Qðs
0a0Þ   QðsaÞ
QðsaÞ  QðsaÞ þ aQd
Following each step, as with SR-Dya, we also selected 10 one-step samples (according to
recency weighted probabilities with replacement) from the stored history, and replayed each
to update Q according to equation the update above. Following transitions in which a learned
change occurred to either the reward function or available actions, k one-step samples were
selected and used to update the model, where k was set to 10 in the insufficient replay condi-
tion and to 10000 in the sufficient replay condition. Samples were drawn the same way as in
SR-Dyna.
Parameters. All algorithms converted Q-values to actions using an -greedy policy which
selects the highest-valued action with probability 1 – , and chooses randomly with probability
. Parameters for all models and each simulation were varied and we observed that the qualita-
tive results can be observed under a wide range of parameter settings (S1 Table). For the fig-
ures in the results section, the following parameters were used. For all models,  was set to 0.1.
In addition, all models used a discount parameter γ = 0.95. The three SR models used a weight
learning rate parameter αw = 0.3. Model Dyna-Q used a learning rate αQ = 0.3. In addition to
these parameters, SR-TD and SR-Dyna used a successor-matrix learning rate of αsr = 0.3 and
SR-MB used a policy learning rate of απ = 0.1.
Supporting information
S1 Fig. Advantage of TD learning over direct reward learning of weights. a) Task environ-
ment. On each trial, the agent was placed in state S. Trials ended when the agent reached state
R, which contained a reward value of 10. Unlike the latent learning task in the main text, this
task did not contain an exploratory period enabling the agent to learn the successor matrix
prior to the introduction of reward. b) Number of steps on each trial for an agent learning
weights using TD learning and an agent learning weights applying delta rule to the reward
function. Plotted lines show average over 500 runs. 95% confidence intervals are contained
within line thickness. Parameters for each of the two algorithms were set to those that mini-
mized the average number of total steps over 80 trials. Such parameters were found by grid
search over αsr 2 [.1,.3,.5,.7,.9],  2 [0.1,0.3,0.5] and αw 2 [.1,.3,.5,.7,.9]. Both algorithms
learned the SR using the SR-TD update. The “TD Learning” algorithm updated weights using
TD learning. The “Reward Learning” algorithm updated weights by delta-rule learning on the
immediate reward function. Specifically, after performing action a in state s and receiving
reward r, the following update was performed: w(s) w(s) + αw(r − w(s)).”
(TIF)
S2 Fig. Preventing replay slows acquisition for both SR-Dyna and Dyna-Q. Both algorithms
under the two sampling settings were simulated on the task displayed in S1 Fig. a) Results of
simulations with SR-Dyna. b) Results of simulations with Dyna-Q. Both a) and b) show num-
ber of steps on each trial for agent permitted to replay 20 samples between each decision and
an agent not permitted to replay any samples. Plotted lines show average over 500 runs. 95%
confidence intervals are contained within shaded region around lines. For each algorithm and
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sample setting, we chose parameters that minimized average total number of steps over 80 tri-
als by a grid search in the following range: αsr 2 [.1,.3,.5,.7,.9],  2 [0.1,0.3,0.5], αw 2
[.1,.3,.5,.7,.9], and αQ 2 [.1,.3,.5,.7,.9].
(TIF)
S1 Table. Robustness of simulation results to varying parameters. Here, we display the
results of simulating each task, using each algorithm under a wide variety of parameter set-
tings. Each table below corresponds to a particular algorithm simulating a particular task. For
a given parameter setting, the algorithm was simulated 500 times. A check indicates that the
500 run median value function produced by that parameter setting results in the optimal policy
for the task. A cross indicates that it does not result in the optimal policy.
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